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We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of 
information about other voters’ decisions. We do so in a participation game, in which we 
distinguish between early  and late voters. Each late voter is told about one  early voter’s 
turnout decision. Cases are distinguished where the voters are allies (support the same group) 
or adversaries (with opposing preferences) and where they are uncertain about each other’s 
preferences. Our experimental results show that the social context matters: this information 
increases aggregate turnout by approximately 50%. The largest effect is observed for allies. 
Early voters strategically try to use their first mover position and late voters respond to this.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The ‘voter paradox’ of  why substantial  portions of  large electorates turn out  to  vote has 
puzzled  economists  since  Downs  (1957).  In  the  Downsian  framework,  the  probability  of 
being pivotal in large-scale elections is negligible and, therefore, expected revenues from 
casting a vote fall short of the costs. Many theoretical and empirical papers have tried to 
explain the paradox, but not until the nineteen-eighties did rational choice models start to 
appear that show that turning out to vote might be rational in an instrumental sense (see 
Ledyard 1984, or Schram 1991, and the references given there). 
  For the rational choice approach, an important step forward was made by Palfrey and Ro-
senthal (1983). They model the turnout decision as a participation game and study it game-
theoretically. In this game, there are two or more teams. Everyone has to make a private deci-
sion on whether or not to ‘participate’ in an action, where participation is costly. Participation 
is beneficial to every member in one’s own team and harmful to members of other teams. The 
team with the higher number of ‘participants’ gets the (higher) reward.
1 Palfrey and Rosenthal 
show that in some cases Nash equilibria with sizeable levels of participation exist. However, 
when  the  game  allows  for  substantial  uncertainty  about  voters’  preferences  and  costs, 
equilibria with high participation generally disappear (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985). 
  In this paper, we show that a voter’s social environment can have a strong effect on the 
decision to vote. We do so, while maintaining the rational choice framework offered by the 
participation  game.  An  important  element  of  the  social  environment  is  the  information 
exchanged within it. For the turnout decision, one piece of information that may be relevant is 
what other voters did. Because people generally do not all vote at the same time of day, this 
information is often available. We introduce it into the participation game by telling some 
voters the turnout decision of another voter in their surrounding. This is inspired by the idea 
that it is natural for interaction to take place before and during elections amongst individuals 
in small social environments or neighborhoods (e.g., a family or working place). Of course, 
this interaction can be very complex and take on a variety of forms. To isolate the effects of 
the  specific  ‘neighborhood  information  exchange’  (NIE)  we  are  interested  in,  we  use 
laboratory  experiments.  Our  experimental  design  is  based  on  a  model  that  extends  the 
participation game to include NIE. 
                                                
1 The participation game simultaneously combines a between-group conflict for the higher reward with a within-
group conflict, where each group member has an incentive to free ride on costly participation by other members 
of the own group.   2
  In our model, we focus on neighborhoods that consist of two voters only.
2 Information 
exchange  between  these  voters  has  two  dimensions.  First,  neighbors  know  whether  they 
support  the  same  or  opposing  candidates  (or  that  they  are  uncertain  about  each  other’s 
preferences). Second, one of them can observe whether her neighbor has cast a vote or not. 
For  this  we  distinguish  between  early  voters  and  late  voters.  By  doing  so,  our  study 
investigates a mix of sequential and simultaneous voting. Though such a mix seems to be 
realistic,  our  model  cannot,  for  obvious  reasons,  represent  all  possible  hybrids  that  exist 
outside the laboratory. Nevertheless, we are able to isolate three elements in the complex 
interaction  between  voters  that  may  help  us  better  understand  the  effect  of  information 
exchange between them. First, we carefully distinguish between behavior in distinct roles, i.e. 
early and late voters, and how this affects turnout. This distinction between the origin of the 
information (early voters) and its recipients (late voters) will allow us to study the strategic 
use of the turnout decision to influence other voters. Second, we are able to systematically 
investigate the way behavior differs when neighbors are allies or adversaries. It can make a 
big difference whether you observe someone vote for the candidate you support or for the 
opposing candidate. Third, we will investigate the importance of established bonds between 
group members. This is implemented by either keeping groups fixed over time or mixing 
them before each election. With fixed groups, aggregate behavior is more predictable, which 
may decrease the value of observing the neighbor’s decision as compared to the case where 
group composition varies. 
  Our experimental results show strong effects of information exchange. It increases turnout 
by almost 50%. Moreover, the three elements we focus on matter. First, we observe that early 
voters use their first mover position in an attempt to influence their neighbor, and that late 
voters reciprocate a vote by their neighbor when they are allies. Second, segregation has a 
positive effect on turnout: participation is higher when neighbors are allies, i.e. when they 
support the same candidate. Third, established bonds add to the segregation effect: with fixed 
groups of allies, we observe the highest turnout. Our results lead us to the conclusion that 
participants use the structure of the game to implicitly coordinate towards higher turnout for 
the group they are in, even when high turnout is not part of the equilibrium we derive for the 
game. A combination of segregation and established bonds gives the most fertile ground for 
this implicit coordination. 
                                                
2 A restriction to two-person neighborhoods is an obvious limitation. However, we are interested in the effect of 
information per se, and for this, it suffices to focus on the simplest case. Moreover, we shall show that the effect 
is large, even for the two-person neighborhoods. Bigger and overlapping neighborhoods are an interesting topic 
for future research.   3
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically investigate the effect of 
information  exchange  on  voter  turnout.  Moreover,  our  paper  contributes  to  the  limited 
experimental  literature  on  participation  games.  Bornstein  (1992)  was  the  first  to  use 
experiments to study participation in small groups. Schram and Sonnemans (1996a,b) vary 
group size and compare elections of proportional representation to winner-takes-all elections. 
Hsu and Sung (2002) investigate participation for equally sized groups in electorates with up 
to 70 voters. Cason and Mui (2003) use the participation game to model reforms and study the 
impact of payoff uncertainty and varying costs. Finally, Großer et al. (2004) study the effect 
of preference uncertainty and differences between allied and floating voters. In all of these 
studies, relatively high rates of participation are found, albeit that lower turnout is observed 
than in most general elections around the world. In our experiments, we see turnout levels that 
are much higher than previously observed  in experimental participation games.  A  typical 
result in previous studies that is replicated in our experiments is that standard Nash equilibria 
find little support. We will argue that this is because these equilibria do not allow for an 
(implicit) within-group coordination that we observe in our experiments. 
  Though neighborhood information exchange has not been studied in a participation game 
before, various studies of voting contain elements that are relevant for our set-up. Of special 
interest are results that relate to the influence on voter participation of (i) social embeddedness 
and communication and (ii) procedures that combine simultaneous and sequential voting. We 
briefly discuss these two strands of literature. 
  First, Putnam et al. (1993) argue that there is an important link between a society’s social 
capital  and  the  level  of  voter  turnout  at  its  elections.  Carlson  (1999)  provides  empirical 
support. One interesting aspect of social embeddedness is whether interaction takes place 
between allies or adversaries. Schram and van Winden (1991) argue that social pressure and 
examples  set  by  group  leaders  (i.e.,  allies)  play  an  important  role  in  a  voter’s  decision. 
Communication  is  an  important  aspect  of  social  embeddedness.  Schram  and  Sonnemans 
(1996b) show that both group identity and within-group communication increase turnout in 
experimental participation games. Goren and Bornstein (2000) find the same; in addition, they 
also show that groups use the opportunity of communication to coordinate on a reciprocal 
strategy  towards  the  other  group.  All  in  all,  interaction  and  within-group  communication 
appears to have a positive effect on voter participation. 
  Second, note that many elections involve elements of both simultaneous and sequential 
voting (e.g., McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1985; Bartels, 1988; Morton and Williams, 1999,   4
2000; Dekel and Piccione, 2000; Battaglini, 2004).
3 Most of these models focus on the ability 
of sequential procedures to increase electoral efficiency by spreading private information. In 
our study, incomplete information is not essential. Rather, we are interested in the exchange 
of  information  about  participation  decisions  within  neighborhoods,  where  preferences  are 
known (we only use incomplete information in one case, where voters do not know which 
candidate their neighbor supports).
4 
  The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  NIE 
participation game and the experimental design and section 3 gives our experimental results 
and interprets them. We conclude in section 4. 
 
2. THE NIE PARTICIPATION GAME AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The NIE participation game consists of two stages. There are two (equally sized) groups of 
players  (voters)  and  within  each  group  an  equal  number  of  senders  (early  voters)  and 
receivers (late voters) of information is distinguished. At stage 1, each sender decides whether 
to participate or abstain. Each sender knows that (only) her receiver-neighbor will observe 
this decision. If the sender participates, she does not take part in stage 2. If she abstains, she 
again decides  on participating or abstaining at stage 2,  but this time she knows  that this 
decision will not be observed. At stage 2, receivers decide whether or not to participate, 
knowing their sender-neighbor’s stage 1 decision.
5 Note that neither senders nor receivers 
observe others’ stage 2 decisions. The outcome of the game is determined by counting all 
stage 1 and 2 participation in the two groups, with the higher reward going to the members of 
the group with the highest participation (with a coin toss deciding in case of a tie). A formal 
description and analysis of our model is presented in Appendix A. 
  The computerized
6 experiment was run at the laboratory of the Center for Research in 
Experimental  Economics  and  political  Decision  making  (CREED)  of  the  University  of 
Amsterdam.  Subjects  were  recruited  from  the  university’s  undergraduate  population.  168 
subjects participated in 10 sessions. Each session lasted about 2 hours (cf. Appendix B for the 
                                                
3In related studies, games are analyzed where a political action other than voting is followed by simultaneous 
voting (e.g. Lohmann, 1994a,b). 
4 Jackson (1983) empirically studies the effect on voter turnout of election night reporting, i.e. the projection of 
results before the end of the polls, during the 1980 US presidential election. Jackson reports that the projection 
(i.e., information exchange) decreased the turnout of voters who had not yet participated. 
5Notice the difference between our setup and standard models of information cascades and herding in economic 
(e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992) and social choice (e.g., Fey, 1996; Wit, 1997) environments. 
There, everybody is both sender and receiver, except for the first and the last player. In addition, contrary to the 
participation game, there is a common interest among players in these models.  
6 RatImage (Abbink and Sadrieh, 1995) was used to program the software.   5
read-aloud instructions). Earnings in the experiment are measured in tokens. At the end of a 
session token earnings were transferred to cash at a rate of 4 tokens to one Dutch Guilder (≈ € 
0.45). On average, subjects earned 48.66 Guilders. 
  Each electorate consists of 12 voters: two groups of 6 subjects each. Given that we do not 
know the structure of the correlations across observations, we treat the electorate as the only 
independent unit of observation, giving us 14 such observations. Each subject is either sender 
or receiver throughout the experiment and knows her role from the beginning of the session. 
There  are  always  3  senders  and  3  receivers  in  each  group  and  6  neighborhoods  (each 
consisting of 1 sender and 1 receiver) in each electorate.
7 
  Our first treatment is related to the matching protocol of subjects within an electorate, 
where we distinguish ‘partners’ and ‘strangers’ (cf. Andreoni, 1988). In ‘partners’, subjects in 
an electorate are randomly allocated to groups at the beginning of the first round, and groups 
remain constant thereafter. In ‘strangers’, subjects are randomly reallocated to the two groups 
at the beginning of each round. A natural interpretation of partners versus strangers in this 
context is that partners constitute an electorate of voters who remain loyal to their party across 
elections. Strangers can be seen as ‘floating voters’ who may switch from one party to another 
between elections (cf. Großer et al. 2004). Of course, partners and strangers are varied in a 
between-subject design. 
  Our second treatment is varied in a within-subject design. This deals with the information 
about the neighbor’s vote. If voters are ‘informed’, we distinguish rounds in which neighbors 
are from the same (‘allies’) and different (‘adversaries’) groups, and rounds in which ‘allies’ 
and ‘adversaries’ each occur with probability of 0.5 (‘uncertain’). As a control, we organized 
four ‘uninformed’ electorates in which no information about others’ votes was provided. In 
these sessions we keep the decision structure as close as possible to ‘informed’ by maintaining 
the two decision making stages described above as well as the labels ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’. 
In the analysis below, we will refer to subjects in these sessions as neighbors, senders, and 
receivers even though no information was exchanged between them. 
  Each session lasts 99 decision rounds. 33 rounds use the information condition ‘allies’, 33 
use ‘adversaries’, and 33 use ‘uncertain’.
8 This is varied in a random, predetermined manner. 
                                                
7 In 4 sessions, two electorates participated simultaneously, and 6 sessions were held with one electorate each. In 
sessions with more than one electorate, there is no interaction of any kind between subjects in different electo-
rates. This is known to all subjects. 
8We chose to vary the structure of preferences in neighborhoods in a within-subject design (33 rounds of each 
information condition) in order to restrict the number of electorates needed. On the other hand, we decided to 
study  the  uninformed  case  in  separate  sessions  in  order  to  link  our  experiment  to  previous  experimental 
participation games. As a consequence, uninformed subjects made 99 decisions in the same setting, whereas   6
In each round, each subject in the winning group receives a revenue of 4 tokens and each 
subject in the losing group of 1 token. Participation costs are 1 token (avoiding negative 
payoffs). Table 1 summarizes treatments and parameters. 
 



















Informed Partners (IP)  99 (33)  4 (1)  1  12 (6)  3 (3)  5 
Informed Strangers (IS)  99 (33)  4 (1)  1  12 (6)  3 (3)  5 
Uninformed Strangers (US)  99 (33)  4 (1)  1  12 (6)  3 (3)  4 
Note: ‘I’ = ‘informed’, ‘U‘ = ‘uninformed’, ‘P’ = ‘partners’, and ‘S’ = ‘strangers’.  
 
In appendix A, we derive quasi-symmetric Nash equilibria for our experimental parameters.
9 
One such equilibrium is in pure strategies and involves all voters casting a vote. Others in-
volve behavioral strategies (cf. table A1 in appendix A), which allow us to formulate five hy-
potheses with respect to the comparative statics in our design: 
 
  H1:  Turnout is higher when neighbors are adversaries than when they are allies. 
  H2:   When they are allies, senders participate at a higher rate than receivers. 
  H3:   Senders participate at higher rates at stage 2 than at stage 1. 
  H4:  Receivers participate more after observing abstention than after observing a vote. 
  H5:  After  observing  a  vote,  receivers  are  more  likely  to  participate  if  the  neighbor  is  an 
adversary than in case of an ally. 
 
We will return to these comparative statics based on Nash equilibria, when presenting our 
results. 
  We  have  no  theoretical  basis  to  predict  the  effect  of  our  strangers  versus  partners 
treatment. Though Schram and Sonnemans (1996a) report higher turnout for partners in a 
standard  participation  game,  the  effect  of  NIE  might  differ  for  the  two,  so  it  is  unclear 
whether we should expect the same result. Intuitively, the information value of observing a 
neighbor’s decision will be lower when groups are fixed as compared to the case where group 
                                                                                                                                                   
informed subjects made 33 decisions in each of the three conditions. The differences between uninformed and 
informed are so strong (and stay strong if we only consider the first 33 or the last 33 rounds of uninformed), that 
we are confident that the number of rounds did not affect the results that we will present below. 
9 Goeree and Holt (forthcoming) show that a logit equilibrium can account for the Schram and Sonnemans 
(1996a) data and Cason and Mui (2003) show the same for their own data. Our model is too complex to derive 
logit equilibria, however.   7
composition varies. In partners, aggregate behavior is supposedly more predictable because 
the stable environment allows one to gather information about participation across rounds. 
This intuition predicts that NIE is more important for strangers than for partners. 
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This  section  presents  and  analyzes  our  experimental  results.  We  start  with  overall 
participation for all treatments, followed by an investigation of participation rates in the three 
information conditions. Then, our focus will be on behavior of senders and receivers. After 
discussing electoral efficiency and realized earning distributions, we will try to put the pieces 
of the puzzle together and get a grasp of what the effect of NIE is. For our analysis we use 
nonparametric  statistics  as  described  in  Siegel  and  Castellan,  Jr.  (1988).  For  the  reasons 
mentioned above all of our tests will be conducted at the electorate level.  
 
3.1 AGGREGATE PARTICIPATION RATES 
Figure  1  gives  aggregate  participation  rates  averaged  over  blocks  of  20  rounds  each  (19 
rounds in the last block). 
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RESULT 1:   Neighborhood information exchange increases turnout. 
 
Aggregate average participation rates are substantially higher when information is exchanged 
(IS) than when it is not (US). IS starts at an average participation of 67% in rounds 1-20 and 
ends at 49% in rounds 81-99. At the same time, average participation in US varies between   8
46% and 37%. The null hypothesis of no difference is clearly rejected at the electorate level: 
there  is  not  one  observation  in  US  that  exceeds  those  in  IS  (one-tailed  Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test, 1% significance level). 
 
RESULT 2:   The stability of group composition does not affect turnout. 
 
In our design, the stability of group composition is varied by way of our partners versus 
strangers treatments. The ‘loyal voters’ in IP start at an average participation rate of 65% and 
end at 57%. The floating voters in IS decrease from 67% participation to 49%. A Wilcoxon-




When there  is  no  information  exchange  (US), aggregate  participation  rates  are  at  similar 
levels  to  those  observed  in  previous  experimental  studies  on  participation  games.  For 
example, Schram and Sonnemans (1996a) report average turnout rates of 31% (42%) for the 
winner-takes-all case with two groups of 6 players in strangers (partners). For strangers, this 
is somewhat lower than what we observe in US (38%). Aggregate participation rates in the 
two informed treatments are much higher than previously observed for both partners and 
strangers. 
 
3.2 PARTICIPATION RATES AND NEIGHBORS’ PREFERENCES 
Figure 2 shows participation rates disaggregated for the treatments allies, adversaries, and 
uncertain for IP and IS, respectively.
11 
 
RESULT 3:   When information is exchanged, turnout is highest amongst allies and lowest 
when neighbors do not know each other’s preferences. 
 
We observe the same ranking of participation in both figures, with average participation rates 
highest in allies and lowest in uncertain. This ranking is observed in all blocks of rounds, ex-
cept one. A Friedman two-way analysis of variance by ranks rejects the null hypothesis of no 
ordering in favor of this ranking at the 5% significance level for IP and at 1% significance for 
IS. 
                                                
10  Figure  1  suggests  that  a  difference  may  occur  in  the  last  two  blocks.  The  test  does  not  reject  the  null 
hypothesis of no differences for these blocks either, however. 
11 The number of observations per block differs across information conditions because each condition is used 33 
times in a predefined random sequence. In block 1 (2; 3; 4; 5), allies was used 6 (9; 6; 5; 7), adversaries 5 (7; 8; 
8; 5), and uncertain 9 (4; 6; 7; 7) times.   9
FIGURE 2A: PARTICIPATION RATES IN 
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FIGURE 2B: PARTICIPATION RATES IN 
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  Note the distinct dynamics across information conditions. When voters are loyal to their 
party (IP), participation remains stable (at approximately 70%) for allies.
 12 In adversaries and 
uncertain, however, turnout decreases from the first to the second block of rounds and then 
remains more or less stable (except for a drop in the last block of uncertain). With floating 
voters (IS), participation decreases more or less steadily across rounds. 
  We can use result 3 to test the first of the comparative static predictions that we derived 
from the Nash equilibria for our game. 
 
TEST OF H1.   H1 predicts that turnout is higher when neighbors are adversaries than when they are 
allies. We observe the opposite in Result 3. In section 3.7, we will discuss what may 
be driving this rejection of the equilibrium prediction. 
 
3.3 COMPARING PARTICIPATION RATES FOR SENDERS AND RECEIVERS 
Table 2 gives the participation rates per treatment, role, and stage across all rounds. We start 
with a comparison of participation by senders and receivers. 
 
RESULT 4:   Senders participate at a higher rate than receivers do. 
There are 7 possible comparisons for sender and receiver turnout (3 conditions each in IP and 
IS, plus US). Only when neighbors are uncertain about each others’ preferences in IP do we 
observe (non-significant) higher turnout for receivers. Aggregating across allies, adversaries 
                                                
12This result supports studies suggesting that segregation (i.e., allies) increases participation (Butler and Stokes 
1974; Ragin 1986;  Takács 2001,  2002).  That  participation is lowest with uncertainty may  seem surprising. 
Intuitively, one would expect participation in uncertain to lie between that in allies and adversaries. Apparently, 
the additional source of uncertainty drives down participation. A similar observation is made in Großer et al. 
(2004), where participation rates are lower when uncertainty about others’ preferences is introduced.   10
TABLE 2: PARTICIPATION RATES  
Participation rates 




2*  Total  Turnout 
observed 
Abstention 
observed  Total  Total 
allies  .634  .251  .726  .631  .619  .626  .676 
adversaries  .277  .432  .589  .518  .589  .570  .579 
uncertain  .371  .279  .546  .659  .533  .580  .563  IP 
Total  .427  .321  .621  .603  .580  .592  .606 
allies  .619  .268  .721  .586  .430  .526  .624 
adversaries  .388  .434  .654  .557  .513  .530  .592 
uncertain  .366  .298  .555  .580  .473  .512  .533 
IS 
Total  .458  .333  .643  .574  .472  .523  .583 
US  Total  .379  .121  .455  ---  ---  .309  .382 
*Turnout as a fraction of senders making a decision at stage 2. 
 
and  uncertain,  we  always  observe  higher  turnout  by  senders,  though  the  difference  is 
relatively  low  in  IP  (3%-points),  compared  to  IS  (12%-points)  and  US  (15%-points). 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference for IS and US in favor 
of higher rates for senders (10% significance level, one-tailed tests), but cannot reject it for IP 
at the same significance level. When testing for allies, adversaries and uncertain separately, 
we reject the null in favor of higher turnout by senders in 3 out of 6 cases.  
  The  higher  participation  of  senders  than  receivers  in  US  (where  no  information  is 
exchanged) comes as a surprise. Note that receivers participate at the same rate (31%) as 
subjects where no NIE takes place (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996a). This result suggests an 
influence on participation by senders of the two-stage decision procedure itself. We can think 
of three possible explanations. First, there may be a ‘timing effect’ where first movers behave 
differently than second movers, even when no information is exchanged (see, e.g., Rapoport, 
1997; Weber et al., 2004). Second, the labels ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ may cause a framing 
effect (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), provoking senders to participate more. Third, the 
freedom to delay the decision, i.e. because the exact same alternative occurs again at stage 2, 
may be an explanation for our finding. Because US is only used as a benchmark, we will not 
elaborate  on  this  finding.  It  is  important  to  note  that  participation  by  both  senders  and 
receivers in all of the IP and IS conditions is (much) higher than that of senders in US. It is on 
this higher turnout that we focus. 
 
TEST OF H2.   H2 predicts that, when allies, senders participate at a higher rate than receivers do. 
This is supported by the numbers in table 2. One-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks tests 
show that the higher turnout of senders is not statistically significant when the allies   11
are partners (at the 10%-level), but it is when they are strangers (5%-level). When IP 
and IS are aggregated, the difference is statistically significant as well (1%-level). 
 
3.4 SENDER BEHAVIOR 
In aggregate, senders’ participate most in IS and least in US (cf. table 2). Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests show that the differences between IP and US (62% vs. 46%) and IS and US 
(64% vs. 46%) are statistically significant at the 1% level, but the null that senders participate 
at the same rate in IS and IP (64% vs. 62%) is not rejected at the 10% level (all one-tailed 
tests). 
  We can use table 2 to have a closer look at result 3, that turnout is highest amongst allies, 
followed by adversaries. From table 2 it appears that this ranking is mainly caused by the 
senders. Differences across information conditions appear to be smaller for receivers. For 
example, in strangers, there is almost no difference in aggregate receiver behavior across the 
conditions.  In  fact,  for  receivers,  the  differences  are  not  significant  in  either  IP  or  IS 
(Friedman two-way analysis of variance by ranks, 10% significance level). In contrast, the 
differences are significant in both IP (5%-level) and IS (1%-level) for senders. Apparently, 
senders play a crucial role in the aggregate result. 
  Of  course,  senders  have  two  possibilities  to  participate.  Table  2  and  Figure  3  show 
participation rates at each of the two stages. 
 
RESULT 5:   Senders attempt to influence their neighbor. If the receiver is an ally, senders 
mainly vote at stage 1. If the receiver is an adversary, senders participate more 
at stage 2. 
Table 2 and Figure 3 show substantially higher sender participation rates for allies at stage 1 
than at stage 2 in both IP (63% vs. 25%) and IS (62% vs. 27%). The difference is statistically 
significant (5%-level, one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test) in both cases. For adversaries, 
we observe the opposite: senders’ participation rates are lower at stage 1 than at stage 2 (28% 
vs.  43%  in  IP;  39%  vs.  43%  in  IS).  The  difference  is  significant  (5%-level,  one-tailed 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test) for IP, but not for IS (at the 10% level). In uncertain, senders 
participate at a higher rate at stage 1 than at stage 2 (37% vs. 28% in IP; 37% vs. 30% in IS), 
but the differences are much smaller than in allies and insignificant at the 10% level. 
  Note that ‘senders’ in our control treatment US participate at higher rates at stage 1 than at 
stage 2 (38% vs. 12%). This holds for each electorate. In fact, at stage 1 they participate at the 
same rate as senders do in adversaries or uncertain when information is exchanged. This   12
 
FIGURE 3A: SENDERS’ PARTICIPATION 
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FIGURE 3B: SENDERS’ PARTICIPATION 
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appears to imply that there is a tendency to participate at a base rate of 30-40% by senders at 
stage 1, unless they are matched with an ally, in which case their turnout is almost twice as 
high. In the absence of information, receivers participate at approximately this base rate as 
well.  At  stage  2,  the  ‘uninformed’  base  rate  is  at  approximately  10-15%.  In  allies  and 
uncertain, senders participate at somewhat higher rates than this, but the most noticeable fact 
is that senders whose neighbors are adversaries vote at a much higher rate (43%) at stage 2, 
when their decision is not observed. 
  Participation levels of senders and their patterns of behavior are similar for partners and 
strangers. In this respect, our conjecture that information exchange is more important in stran-
gers is not supported for senders. However, senders are trying to influence their receiver-
neighbors. If their choices have different effects on receivers in partners than in strangers, 
there may be an indirect effect of senders’ behavior on the role of information exchange. We 
will discuss this in the next subsection. Here, we close with a result for the comparative 
statics. 
 
TEST OF H3.   H3 predicts that senders’ turnout rates are higher at stage 2 than at stage 1. Result 5 
shows that this is rejected for allies and supported for adversaries. 
 
3.5 RECEIVER BEHAVIOR 
Our  focus  is  on  the  response  of  informed  receivers  to  their  neighbor’s  stage  1  decision. 
Uninformed receivers’ behavior serves as a benchmark. We have two results. 
 
 
RESULT 6:   Receivers participate at a higher rate in partners than in strangers. 
   13
Contrary to senders, receivers behave differently in partners and strangers. Their turnout is 
lower in strangers (59% vs. 52%); both are substantially higher than the 31% in US (cf. table 
2). One-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests reject the null hypothesis of no differences in 
favor  of  higher  rates  for  receivers  in  both  informed  conditions  than  in  uninformed  (1% 
significance level) and in IP than in IS (10%-level). This holds for allies, adversaries, and 
uncertain and for both observed decisions of their sender-neighbors (the only exception is that 
receivers  vote  at  a  higher  rate  in  IS  than  in  IP  after  observing  a  vote  in  adversaries). 
Moreover, aggregate participation by receivers is lower than by senders, especially in IS (cf. 
result 4). 
 
RESULT 7:   Receivers reciprocate allied senders’ stage 1 decisions in strangers. 
 
For  partners  (IP),  responses  to  senders’  stage  1  decisions  vary:  participation  rates  after 
observing a sender vote are equal to those after abstention in allies (63% vs. 62%), they are 
lower in adversaries (52% vs. 59%), and higher in uncertain (66% vs. 53%). Only the latter 
difference is statistically significant at the 10%-level (one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks tests). 
In contrast, in IS we always observe higher participation rates after senders participate than 
when abstention is observed (allies: 59% vs. 43%; adversaries: 56% vs. 51%; uncertain: 58% 
vs. 47%). Wilcoxon signed ranks tests reject the null of no difference for allies and uncertain 
at the 10%-level (one-tailed tests), but cannot reject it for adversaries. 
  Contrary  to  senders,  this  result  for  receivers  supports  our  conjecture  that  information 
exchange is more important in strangers than in partners. Note an important element of our 
design:  receiver  responses  to  sender  stage  1  decisions  remain  unobserved  by  sender-
neighbors, making it impossible for receivers to directly inform their neighbors about their 
decision. In partners, however, indirect information is passed on across rounds by way of 
aggregate (group) turnout(s). This seems to outweigh local neighborhood exchange (for more, 
see  section  3.7).  As  a  consequence,  receivers  do  not  respond  systematically  to  sender-
neighbors’ stage 1 decisions in partners. 
 
TEST OF H4.   H4 predicts that receivers respond to observed abstention by participating more. This 
is rejected by our data, especially for the strangers treatment.  
TEST OF H5.   H5 compares receivers’ responses to an observed vote and predicts a higher turnout 
for receivers-adversaries. Table 2 rejects this prediction: in both IP and IS, receivers 
vote more after seeing an ally vote than after participation by an adversary. 
   14
3.6 EFFICIENCY AND EARNINGS 
The efficiency of an allocation is simply defined as the sum of actual round earnings divided 
by  30  (with  a  minimum  of  60%).
13  Realized  efficiency  is  inversely  related  to  aggregate 
turnout. Because of the high participation in both informed treatments, average efficiency is 
relatively low at 76% in IP and 77% in IS. In US it is 85%. It follows directly from results 1 
and 2 that the differences between informed and uninformed are statistically significant. 
  As for earnings, we know from result 4 that senders vote at a higher rate than receivers. 
Because the number of senders and receivers in the winning (and losing) groups are always 
equal, a direct implication is that senders earn less than receivers do. Finally, we consider the 
distributions of earnings for the various treatments. These are plotted in figure 4. 
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Figure 4 clearly shows a more dispersed distribution of earnings in IP than in IS and US. The 
earning distributions of IS and US are singled peaked, whereas that of IP has two peaks. Mean 
earnings are highest in US, because of the lower turnout. A closer inspection reveals that in 
partners-electorates there is typically domination by one group in terms of the number of 
victories. Hence, the weaker group is represented by lower earnings (left peak in figure 4) 
than the stronger group (right peak).
14 
                                                
13Groups are of equal size and in all cases the sum of revenues is the same, independent of participation and 
which group wins. Any participation is costly. Hence, efficiency requires that nobody participates. With our 
parameters, the efficient sum of earnings per round is 6x4+6x1=30. The lowest efficiency occurs when everyone 
votes. In this case, earnings are 6x3+6x0=18. 
14 Lijphart (1997) discusses the problems arising in democracies where turnout is unequal across groups.   15
3.7 INTERPRETING THE RESULTS 
In this subsection, we provide a general picture of the effect of neighborhood information 
exchange on participation. We do so by formulating a conjecture of what is taking place in 
our experiment and providing statistical tests for it. The processes described can account for 
results 1-7 and for our conclusions with respect to H1-H5. 
  The core of our conjecture is an implicit coordination between subjects.
15 This may take 
various forms in our experiment. An important distinction is between coordination at the 
neighborhood- and group-levels. We start the discussion with a second distinction, however, 
that between intra- and inter-group coordination. Within groups, coordination is to higher 
levels of participation, in order to ‘beat’ the other group. Between groups, coordination aims 
at reducing participation in order to decrease costs (i.e., increase efficiency). Coordination in 
participation games has been observed, before. Schram and Sonnemans (1996b) and Goren 
and Bornstein (2000) report an increase in participation, when within-group communication is 
introduced. Both studies use partners. The communication allows for explicit, though not 
binding, coordination. In essence, their results suggest that intra-group coordination (towards 
participation) dominates inter-group coordination (towards abstention). In our experiments, 
we did not allow for communication. Therefore, explicit coordination is not possible. Our 
conjecture is based on the idea that NIE allows for implicit coordination, however. We will 
see that intra-group coordination is dominant here as well.  
  Next,  consider  the  level  at  which  coordination  takes  place.  Introducing  NIE  gives 
participants  an  opportunity  to  (implicitly)  coordinate  within  their  neighborhoods.  This  is 
possible in partners as well as in strangers. On the other hand, (implicit) coordination at the 
group level can arise across rounds in partners, but not in strangers. As a consequence, we 
predicted the relative importance of NIE to be lower in partners than in strangers. Therefore, 
we distinguish between the ways in which NIE works in both treatments.  
  Our  major  finding  holds  for  both,  partners  and  strangers,  however:  NIE  substantially 
increases overall participation. Interaction within neighborhoods has a strong effect per se. 
For strangers, this follows directly from a comparison between IS and US (58% vs. 38%; cf. 
result 1). For partners, we note that Schram and Sonnemans (1996a) report an average turnout 
of 42% without NIE, which is much lower than the 61% we observe. Moreover (as in the stu-
dies mentioned above), we observe no inter-group coordination towards (efficient) abstention.  
                                                
15 Here, our aim is to provide a unified description of the behavioral patterns observed in our experiment. We do 
not intend to neglect voters’ individual incentives. Coordination (explicit or implicit) allows individuals to better 
achieve their individual goals in repeated interactions, however.    16
  First consider strangers, where implicit coordination seems impossible at the group level. 
Here, subjects rely much more on a period-by-period coordination within neighborhoods. The 
difference between allies and adversaries turns out to be important.
16 When neighbors are 
allies, senders signal their preference for joint participation by voting early and we see a 
strong response by receivers. They reciprocate a vote by their neighbor by voting themselves 
at much higher rates than after observing abstention. The situation is completely different 
when neighbors are adversaries. Senders no longer take the initiative to coordinate at higher 
levels of participation. Receivers realize this and do not respond to the observed decision. 
They (rightfully) assume that observed abstention is uninformative about second stage sender 
behavior. This process can account for results 1, 3 (for the allies-adversaries comparison), 4, 
5, and 7 for strangers, for our confirmation of H2 and H3 (for adversaries), and for our 
rejection of H1, H3 (for allies), H4, and H5. 
  In partners, there is an additional opportunity for implicit coordination by establishing 
bonds across rounds. Once again, implicit intra-group coordination appears to be taking place, 
again triggered by sender behavior. When neighbors are allies, senders try to provoke high 
levels by high participation at stage 1 (when they are adversaries, senders withhold their 
‘signals’). This is successful, because it boosts the ‘coordinated’ level of turnout to almost 
70%. However, contrary to strangers, this is not caused by direct reciprocation by receivers. 
Even receivers who observe abstention vote at higher rates (62%, for allies). We attribute this 
to them experiencing higher levels of own group participation in all rounds. In this way, the 
senders’ ‘signals’ have an effect across rounds just as much as within rounds. It lifts the 
‘coordinated’ turnout to a higher level. This partners-effect gives rise to distinct turnout levels 
across groups, yielding the bimodal distribution of earnings described above. These combined 
NIE- and partners-effects, triggered by senders, can account for results 1, 3 (for the allies-
adversaries comparison), 4, 5, and 7 for partners. It also accounts for our confirmation of H2 
and H3 (for adversaries), and for our rejection of H1, H3 (for allies), H4, and H5. 
 
To test our conjecture, we estimate a model of sender and receiver behavior, and compare the 
results to both the predictions of quasi-symmetric Nash equilibria (see table A1 in appendix 
A)  and  our  conjecture  on  implicit  within-group  coordination.
17  We  do  so  separately  for 
partners and strangers. The panel model we estimate is given by: 
 
                                                
16When the neighbors’ preferences are uncertain, we observe intermediate results for both partners and strangers. 
17 Our experimental results show no support for the pure strategies in which everybody participates. Hence, we 
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where i denotes the voter and t denotes the round. 
S
t i D , (
R
t i D , ) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a sender votes at stage 1 (if a receiver votes) and 0, otherwise.
18 ALLIESt is a dummy variable 
distinguishing rounds where neighbors are allies from those where they are adversaries (we 
disregard the rounds where it is uncertain who the neighbor supports because we have no 




−1 ,  is equal to the number of votes cast by 
other members of the voter’s group in the previous round. It is used to capture the cross-round 
effects in our conjecture for partners. The dummy variable  t i T ,  is equal to 1 (0) if receiver i’s 
sender-neighbor voted in round t.  t i, ε  and  i µ  are error terms, where the latter is a random 
effect  used to  correct for  the  panel structure in our data. The  β ’s are coefficients to be 
estimated. 
  Table 3 presents the predictions for the coefficients and the results of our random effects 
probit estimation.
19 Note that the results always support either the Nash predictions or our 
conjecture (or both). However, our conjecture finds much more support: all predictions except 
two are corroborated by the data. The first unexpected result (based on a test result at the 
10%-significance  level)  is  that  receivers  in  partners  respond  negatively  to  a  vote  by  an 
adversary-sender ( 1 , = t i T  and  0 , = × t t i ALLIES T ). On the one hand, this supports the Nash 
prediction, on the other hand, it could also be a straightforward statistical consequence of the 
dominance of one group over the other in terms of the number of victories (cf. subsection 3.6). 
Voters who observe turnout (abstention) by an adversary-neighbor are more likely to be in the 
dominated (dominant) group, hence, more likely to abstain (vote). The other unexpected result 
is that receivers in strangers vote less when allies than when adversaries. It seems that (as 
predicted by the Nash equilibrium) receivers have a lower propensity to participate when 
allies, unless they are stimulated by their sender-neighbors ( 1 , = × t t i ALLIES T ). 
  Our  results  reject  many  of  the  Nash  predictions.  To  some  extent  this  may  be  a 
consequence of our restriction to quasi-symmetric equilibria or of not allowing for cross- 
round effects in the finitely repeated game. If we drop either of the restrictions, a plethora of 
                                                
18  We  only  consider  senders’  stage  1  behavior  because  this  is  what  our  conjecture  is  most  explicit  about. 
Moreover, we include the round (scaled by dividing by 100) in the equation to allow for learning effects. 
19 This empirical analysis serves to test our conjecture by investigating individual choices. Therefore, we no 
longer use the electorate as the unit of observation, but the individual. The random effects specification corrects 
for correlations between an individual’s choices across rounds.   18
 
TABLE 3: RANDOM EFFECTS PROBIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 





2  Estimate  Nash
1  Conjecture
2  Estimate 
S
0 β   n.p.  n.p.     -1.17 (7.73)*  n.p.  n.p.     -0.40 (2.61)* 
S
1 β   n.p.  n.p.     -0.07 (0.57)  n.p.  n.p.     -0.15 (1.12) 
S
2 β   +  +      1.32 (16.96)*  +  +      0.83 (11.93)* 
S
3 β   0  +      0.09 (2.89)*  0  0      0.04 (1.33) 
R
0 β   n.p.  n.p.     -0.09 (0.46)  n.p.  n.p.      0.53 (3.48)* 
R
1 β   n.p.  n.p.     -0.08 (0.69)  n.p.  n.p.  -0.93 (7.17)* 
R
2 β   −  0      0.10 (0.29)  −  0     -0.33 (3.42)* 
R
3 β   0  +      0.11 (3.78)*  0  0      0.03 (0.29) 
R
4 β   −  0     -0.20 (1.82)**  −  0    -0.05 (0.50) 
R
5 β   −  0      0.23 (1.63)  −  +      0.52 (3.73)* 
Notes: Results for the random effects estimates are available from the authors. The coefficients are defined in eq. 
(1).  Absolute  z-values  are  given  in  parentheses.  *  indicates  significance  at  the  1%-level  and  **  indicates 
significance at the 10%-level. For the predictions: ‘n.p.’ = no prediction; ‘−’ = negative coefficient predicted; ‘0’ 
= prediction is that there is no effect; ‘+’ = positive effect predicted. A shaded cell for a prediction indicates that 
it is supported by our data. 
1The Nash predictions are the same for partners and strangers. Specifically, the signs predicted here follow from 
the quasi symmetric Nash equilibria described in section 2; the signs for the  2 β ’s follow from table A1 in 
appendix A; the ‘0’ for the  3 β ’s is because no cross-round effects are predicted for this finite game (see the 
discussion in the main text). The negative signs for  4 β  and  5 β  are predicted by H4 and H5, respectively. 
2From our conjecture it follows that senders vote more at stage 1, if allies ( 0 2 >
S β , for partners and strangers); 
that receivers are not affected by the information condition ( 0 2 =
R β , for partners and strangers); that senders 
and receivers respond positively to their own group turnout in previous rounds (β3’s positive) for partners but not 
so (β3’s = 0) for strangers; that receivers do not respond to a sender’s vote in partners ( 0 5 4 = =
R R β β ) and only 
respond positively to an allied sender’s vote in strangers ( 0 ; 0 5 4 > =
R R β β ). 
 
equilibria appear, however. In  essence, letting these restrictions  go implies that  the  Nash 
concept loses its predictive power. In contrast, the straightforward predictions derived from 
our conjecture find support in the data. 
  We conclude that implicit intra-group coordination at the neighborhood- and group-level 
for partners and only at the neighborhood-level in strangers can explain most of our findings. 
In both cases, senders play an important coordinating role. This implicit coordination also 
explains why the Nash equilibria predict poorly, because these do no allow for any kind of 
coordination. Two results still need to be explained. Our result 2 (that aggregate participation 
levels are the same for  fixed  groups  and changing  groups)  implies that the two  types of 
implicit coordination yield comparable turnout rates for partners and strangers. Result 6 (that 
receivers participate more in partners than in strangers) is a consequence of receivers’ role in 
group-level coordination in partners. Other findings that remain unexplained are: (i) senders   19
vote at a higher rate at stage 1 than at stage 2, even without NIE. As discussed above, we can 
think of a number of reasons why this might be the case; (ii) the uncertainty created in our 
treatment uncertain decreases participation. This explains the last part of result 3, but will not 
be elaborated, further. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Many social scientists are aware that social embeddedness matters for behavior in public 
goods settings in general and for voter participation in particular. Putnam et al. (1993), for 
example,  argue  that  there  is  an  important  link  between  a  society’s  social  capital  and  its 
civilians’ voter participation. Empirical support for this idea is given by Carlson (1999). This 
social capital or embeddedness has many dimensions, however. One important element is 
information about others’ behavior. In this study, we have isolated this element by focusing 
on the exchange of information within ‘neighborhoods’ of two voters in an electorate. We did 
so by extending the traditional participation game to allow for ‘neighborhood information 
exchange’ (NIE). At a first stage, ‘sender-voters’ decide whether or not to participate and 
their  receiver-neighbor  observes  this  decision.  In  case  they  abstain,  senders  again  decide 
whether or not to participate at a second stage, this time simultaneously with the receivers. 
Sender- and receiver-neighbors are either known to be allies or adversaries or are uncertain 
about each other’s preferences. 
  The  experimental  results  we find for  the  NIE-participation  game  strongly  support  the 
notion  that  this  information  matters.  We  find  substantially  higher  participation  when 
information  is  exchanged  than  is  usually  observed  in  experimental  participation  games. 
Participation is higher when neighbors are allies than when they are adversaries. It is highest 
when allies can also establish bonds across rounds. These mutually reinforcing effects suggest 
a positive influence of segregation on turnout. We also find that senders strategically use their 
first mover position to influence receivers. They participate substantially more when being 
observed by an ally than they do at the second stage, when they are not observed. The reverse 
holds  when  neighbors  are  adversaries.  In  response,  receiver-neighbors  (in  strangers) 
participate more when they observe an ally-sender participating. 
  Though some of the comparative statics we derived from Nash equilibria are supported by 
our data (notably the higher participation by senders when their neighbor is an ally), many are 
not. Overall, we find little empirical support for these equilibria, similar to previous findings 
in public goods experiments in general and experimental participation games in particular.   20
Though it is conceivable that other equilibrium notions might provide a better underpinning 
of our results, it is not the goal of this study to provide these. At this stage of research, our 
aim  is  predominantly  empirical  (albeit  based  on  a  solid  theoretical  foundation).  We  are 
interested in observing the effect of NIE on the participation rates of distinct types of voters. 
The  result  is  unambiguous:  NIE  increases  participation.  We  have  conjectured  about  the 
processes that are driving this result and have provided statistical evidence is support of this 
conjecture.  Our  explanation  centers  around  (implicit)  within-group  coordination  between 
subjects, taking place at both the group and the neighborhood levels for partners and within 
neighborhoods for strangers. In both cases, first stage behavior by senders appears to play an 
important role. 
  Our experiment can be best understood as an attempt to get a grasp of what is happening 
in  the  outside-the-laboratory  world,  in  which  the  social  environment  is  extremely  more 
complex than just the exchange of information between two neighbors. The control we have 
in the laboratory allows us to search for explanations, one step at a time. In our view, an 
interesting  research  field  can  be  opened  by  systematically  varying  the  structure  of 
neighborhoods and the content of information exchanged between voters. We are optimistic 
that looking at social embeddedness can provide us with important insights into the long-
lasting paradox of voting.   i
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: The NIE Participation Game 
In this appendix, we formally describe the NIE-participation game and derive quasi-symmetric Nash equilibria 
for it.  
 
1 THE GAME 
 
The NIE participation  game  has two stages.  We assume  an even and equal number  of risk  neutral  players 
(voters)  B A N N N = =  in each of two groups  B A i , = . Half of the voters in each group is of the type  S (ender), 
denoted by  S i j , ,  B A i , = , and the other half of the type  R (eceiver),  R i j , ,  B A i , = . Hence, each group consists 
of  2 , N N S i =  senders and  2 , N N R i =  receivers. Each voter knows her own type. 
 
DEFINITION 1 (neighborhood ϑ ) 
A neighborhood ϑ  is a matched pair of exactly one sender and one receiver. 
 
Denote the neighbor of  S i j ,  by  ) ( ,S i j n  and the neighbor of  R i j ,  by  ) ( ,R i j n . Each voter is member of exactly one 
neighborhood. Hence, there are N neighborhoods in the electorate. 
 
DEFINITION 2 (matching protocol Θ ) 
We distinguish three matching protocols Θ. The sender and receiver in a neighborhood are either from 








, , , , ;  
2.  different groups,  s adversarie Θ ∈ ϑ ⇒[ ] [ ] i j n i j i j n i j R i R i S i S i ) (
￿
￿  
￿    ) (
￿
￿
, , , , ;  
3.  an uncertain group,  uncertain Θ ∈ ϑ , where  allies Θ  occurs with probability  1 ) ( 0 < Θ < allies prob  and  s adversarie Θ  
with  ) ( s adversarie prob Θ ) ( - 1 allies prob Θ = . 
 
All N neighborhoods ϑ    have the same matching protocol, which is common knowledge. The interpretation of 
definition  2  is  that  voters  either  know  with  certainty  which  candidate  their  neighbor  supports  ( allies Θ   and 
s adversarie Θ ),  or  have  only  probabilistic knowledge ( uncertain Θ )  about  her  preferences. In  the  following,  if the 
matching protocol  m Θ ,  , allies m = uncertain s adversarie   , , is not explicitly mentioned, a general case valid for 
all matching protocols will be under consideration. 
 
The following structure and rules of the game are common knowledge to all players. At stage 1 all  S B S A N N , , +  
senders simultaneously decide whether to vote  1
1
, =
S i j v , or abstain,  0
1
, =
S i j v ,  B A i , = , where superscript ‘1’ 
refers to stage 1. Each receiver ji,R observes (only) the sender  ) ( ,R i j n ’s decision and no other voter observes this 
decision. Senders who turn out to vote at stage 1 have no further decision to make, whereas senders who abstain 
at stage 1 have to decide again on voting at stage 2. 
At stage 2, all  R B R A N N , , +  receivers and all senders who abstained at stage 1 simultaneously decide whether 
to vote,  1    ; 1
, ,
2 = =
R i S i j j v v , or abstain,  ; 0
2
, =
S i j v   0
, =
R i j v ,  B A i , = , where superscript ‘2’ indicates stage 2 for 
senders. After all decisions have been made, voters are told the aggregate outcome of the election (the total 
number of votes cast in each group). No additional information about any other voter’s turnout decision is given.  
  Aggregate turnout for  B A i , = , is given by: 
 














, , S i S i j j v v + ∈{0,1}, because senders can cast only one vote. For later use, we define the aggregate turnout 
of other voters in the same group as sender S i j , , or receiver  R i j , ,  B A i , = , by 
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Revenues (the gross payoff to each member of the winning group) are denoted by w and assumed to be equal for 
senders and receivers in a group ( =
i j w =
S i j w
, R i j w
, ,  B A i , = ): 
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i         (A3) 
 
B A i , = , where  i −  refers to the opposing group. Furthermore, we assume identical participation costs to all 
voters, independent of type and stage, within the range  ) 1 , 0 (
￿ c ,  S i j ,
￿
,  R i j ,
￿
,  B A i , = . The common knowledge 
payoffs (denoted by π ) for senders  S i j , , and receivers  R i j , ,  B A i , = , are then given by 
 
( ) ( )c v v V V w
S i S i i S i j j i i j j   ,
2 1
, , , + = π ;              (A4a) 
 
( ) c v V V w
R i i R i j i i j j , , , = π .          (A4b) 
 
In what follows, it will be useful to define the number of senders in group i , who vote at stage 1 by 
 






S i j j i v S .          (A5) 
 
In case of matching protocol  allies Θ ,  i S  is also the number of receivers in i  who observe a sender voting at stage 
1. For matching protocol  s adversarie Θ , this number is given by  i S . 
 
2 NASH EQUILIBRIA 
For this game, we derive Nash equilibria. Because of the extensive (but straightforward) computations involved, 
we only give the general structure of the way in which these are derived.
20 More details are available from the 
authors. Because notations can become cumbersome, we apply Kuhn’s theorem (1953) by analyzing ‘behavioral’ 
rather than mixed strategies. This will allow us to consider strategies at each stage separately as opposed to 
strategies for the complete game. 
  First,  we  consider  the  four  situations  a  voter  in  group  B A i , = ,  facing  matching  protocol  m Θ , 
, allies m = uncertain s adversarie   , , might be in: 
 
1)  a sender deciding on  ) (
1
, m j S i v Θ  at stage 1; 
2)  a sender having abstained at stage 1,  0 ) (
1
, = Θm j S i v , and deciding on  ) (
2
, m j S i v Θ  at stage 2; 
3a)  a receiver deciding on  ) , 0 (
1
) ( , , m j n j R i R i v v Θ =  at stage 2 after observing her neighbor abstaining at 
stage 1; 
3b)  a receiver deciding on  ) , 1 (
1
) ( , , m j n j R i R i v v Θ = at stage 2 after observing her neighbor voting at stage 1. 
 
Behavioral strategies for each of these situations are, respectively, the probabilities: 
 
1)  ) (
, m j S i s Θ  that  1 ) (
1
, = Θm j S i v ;                           (A6a) 
2)    ) (
, m j S i a Θ  that  1 ) (
2
, = Θ m j S i v ;                         (A6b) 
3a)  ) (
, m j R i a Θ  that  1 ) , 0 (
1
) ( , , = Θ = m j n j R i R i v v ;                       (A6c) 
3b)  ) (
, m j R i t Θ  that  1 ) , 1 (
1
) ( , , = Θ = m j n j R i R i v v .                       (A6d) 
 
A voter will vote with probability 1 if the expected benefits minus the costs  c are higher than the expected 
benefits from abstention. She will mix when the two are equal. This yields the following four turnout conditions 
(A7)-(A10) for the situations distinguished. 
 
CONDITION 1 (senders, stage 1): 
Sender  S i j ,  will vote with probability 1 at stage 1 ( 1 ) (
, = Θm j S i s ) iff 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ],   0 ) (          1 ) (
1 1
, , 2 1 , , 2 1 = Θ > = Θ m j j strat strat m j j strat strat S i S i S i S i v Exp Exp v Exp Exp π π  
                                                
20 Given the results in Goeree and Holt (forthcoming) and Cason and Mui (2003), it would also be interesting to derive logit 
equilibria for this game. The game is too complex to derive these, however.  
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where expectation operators are due to (i) strategic uncertainty about others’ decisions at stage 1 ( 1 strat ); and 
(ii) strategic uncertainty about others’ decisions at stage 2 ( 2 strat ), given the number of votes at stage 1 in each 
group. Elaborating gives: 
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 Θ = + − −
− ,       (A7) 
 
B A i , = , for  s adversarie allies m , = . The prob[S] terms in (A7) refer to the stage 1 votes by senders in the two 
groups.
21 The first term after the multiplication operator on the left (right) hand side of the inequality describes 
the  probability  that  this sender’s  group i  will  win  the election if  she  votes (abstains) and  the  second  term 
describes the probability that i will tie the election if  S i j ,  votes (abstains) at stage 1. Note that, in case of 
abstention at stage 1, the sender still has to account for possible costs at stage 2. 
 
CONDITION 2 (senders, stage 2): Similarly, sender  S i j ,  will vote with probability 1 at stage 2 iff the expected 
payoff of turnout is higher than that of abstention: 
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B A i , = , for  s adversarie allies m , = . Rearranging gives 
 























 = Θ = + × − −
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i i j m i
j
i S S v V V prob
S i
S i , , 0 , 1
1
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 = Θ = + − −
−
i i j m i
j
i S S v V V prob
S i
S i , , 0 ,
1
,
, c 2 > .                 (A8) 
 
CONDITION 3a (receivers at stage 2 after observing abstention): Given  0
1
) ( , =
R i j n v , the expected payoff from 
voting exceeds that from abstention when: 
 























 = Θ > + × − −
−
i i j n m i
j
i S S v V V prob
R i




             ( ) c S S v V V prob i i j n m i
j
i R i






 = Θ = + + − −





                                                
21 Note that  } 2 / ,..., 1 { N Si ∈  if a sender participates at stage 1 and  } 2 / ,..., 0 { N Si ∈ if she abstains. This is reflected in the 
summation in (eq. A7).  
  vii
























 = Θ > × − −
−
i i j n m i
j
i S S v V V prob
R i










 = Θ = + − −
−
i i j n m i
j
i S S v V V prob
R i






B A i , = , where  1 = x ;  0 = y  for  allies m = , and  0 = x ;  1 = y  for  s adversarie m = .
22 Rearranging gives 
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i i j n m i
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, c 2 > .     (A9) 
 
CONDITION 3b (stage 2): (receivers at stage 2 after observing a vote): Given  1
1
) ( , =
R i j n v , the expected payoff 
from voting exceeds that from abstention when: 
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B A i , = , where  1 = x ;  0 = y  for  allies m = , and  0 = x ;  1 = y  for  s adversarie m = .
23 Rearranging gives 
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−
i i j n m i
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i S S v V V prob
R i
R i , , 1 ,
1
) ( ,
, c 2 >                (A10) 
 
The conditions for  uncertain Θ  are a probability mix of the respective conditions with probabilities  ) ( allies prob Θ  
and  ) ( s adversarie prob Θ . This gives a game of incomplete information. 
 
Next, we define the equilibria considered for this NIE participation game.
24 
 
DEFINITION 3 (Quasi-symmetric equilibrium) 
An equilibrium in behavioral strategies in the NIE participation game is quasi-symmetric if it holds that: 
 
] 1 , 0 [
, , ∈ ≡ = s s s
S k S i h j ,  S i j , ∀ ,  S k h , ,    B A k i , , = , 
] 1 , 0 [
, , ∈ ≡ = S h j a a a
S k S i ,  S i j , ∀ ,  S k h , ,    B A k i , , = , 
] 1 , 0 [
, , ∈ ≡ = R h j a a a
R k R i ,  R i j , ∀ ,  R k h , ,    B A k i , , = , and 
] 1 , 0 [
, , ∈ ≡ = t t t
R k R i h j ,  R i j , ∀ ,  R k h , ,    B A k i , , = .                       (A11) 
                                                
22  In  allies,  } 1 2 / ,..., 0 { − ∈ N Si   because  i   observed  a  stage  1  abstention  in  the  own  group.  Similarly 
} 1 2 / ,..., 0 { − ∈ − N S i  in adversaries. 
23 Now, i  observes a stage 1 vote, so  } 2 / ,..., 1 { N Si ∈  in allies and  } 2 / ,..., 1 { N S i ∈ −  in adversaries. 
24 It is common to focus on quasi-symmetric equilibria for participation games (e.g., Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983). Dropping 
quasi-symmetry yields a plethora of Nash equilibria with no obvious refinements to guide predictions.  
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In words, all voters in any particular decision situation play the same behavioral strategy, independent of the 
group they are in. This reduces our equilibrium analysis to four strategies. The equilibrium is denoted by ‘quasi-
symmetric’ because strategies are not limited to be symmetric across players in different positions. 
 
PROPOSITION (Quasi-symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies): 
(i)  If  2 1 > c ,  the  only  Nash  equilibrium  is  where  nobody  votes:  0 ) (
1
, = Θm j S i v ,  0 ) (
2
, = Θm j S i v , 
0 ) , 0 (
1
) ( , , = Θ = m j n j R i R i v v ,  0 ) , 1 (
1
) ( , , = Θ = m j n j R i R i v v ,  S i j , ∀ ,  R i j , ∀ ,  B A i , = ,  uncertain s adversarie allies m , , = . 




 = Θ ∧ = Θ 0 ) (       1 ) (
2 1
, , m j m j S i S i v v ∨  
 ∧ = Θ    0 ) (
1
, m j S i v  
 = Θ 1 ) (
2
, m j S i v , 1 ) , 0 (
1
) ( , , = Θ = m j n j R i R i v v , and  
  1 ) , 1 (
1
) ( , , = Θ = m j n j R i R i v v ,  S i j , ∀ ,  R i j , ∀ ,  B A i , = ,  uncertain s adversarie allies m , , = . 
 
Proof  (straightforward application of Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983, for equal group sizes). 
 
To find quasi-symmetric equilibria in behavioral strategies (separately for the distinct information conditions 
m Θ ), first the decision at stage 2 is elaborated (backwards induction), using conditions (A8), (A9) and (A10) 
stated  as  equalities.  The  probabilities  in  these  equations  are  tedious  but  straightforward  combinations  of 
binomials using the probabilities defined in definition 3. This gives three equations for the four probabilities 
,   ,   , R S a a s  and t . Senders at stage 1 anticipate the best responses implicit in these equations and will mix with a 
probability  s  that  equates  the  expected  value  of  voting  and  abstaining  (eq.  A7),  once  again  involving  a 
combination of binomials. This gives a fourth equation for the four probabilities. 
For the parameters of our experiments (cf. section 2), we can derive these quasi-symmetric Nash equilibria for 
the stage game. Normalizing revenue to lie between 0 and 1, we have  3 / 1 = c . Following the proposition, we 
conclude that everyone casting a vote (with senders casting it either at stage 1 or at stage 2) is a Nash equilibrium 
in  pure  strategies
25.  For  allies m =   and  s adversarie m = ,  the  quasi-symmetric  equilibria  in  behavioral 
strategies
26 for the stage game are given in table 2. For  uncertain m = , no such equilibria exist. Using backwards 
induction, these equilibria hold for each round, in partners and strangers.
27 Table A1 presents the equilibria in 
behavioral strategies. 
 
TABLE A1: QUASI-SYMMETRIC NASH EQUILIBRIA IN BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES 










.791  1  1  .119  1  .303  .652 
allies  .689  1  1  .560  1  .697  .848 
adversaries  .406  .839  .904  .764  1  .904  .904 
Informed 
uncertain  − 
Uninformed  .107  or  .893* 
Strategies:  s = senders at stage 1;  S a = senders at stage 2; t = receivers after observing participation,  R a = receivers after observing 
abstention. 
  *Any combination of probabilities s  and  S a  that yields  S a s s ) 1 ( − + = .107 or .893 is an equilibrium. 
 
Note that there are two equilibria for  allies m = .
28 Moreover, equilibria are the same for partners and strangers. 
Table A1 shows that expected overall participation is higher for adversaries (.904) than for allies (.652 and 
.848). Uninformed provides the lowest (.107) and a very high (.893) expected turnout, which makes it difficult to 
formulate comparative statics predictions vis-à-vis the informed cases. For informed, a comparison of equilibria 
does provide such predictions, however. In the equilibria for allies, senders participate at substantially higher 
                                                
25 This is easy to confirm for the parameters chosen. A unilateral deviation from 100% turnout saves 1 token but decreases 
the expected revenue from 2.5 to 1. 
26 In some cases, some voters do not mix in equilibrium. 
27 We abstract from coordination on Pareto dominant equilibria by means of punishment by playing the inefficient pure 
strategy equilibrium where everybody participates.  
28  The  two  equilibrium  strategies  for  receivers  are  also  a  ‘low’  (.303)  and  ‘high’  (.697)  equilibrium  in  the  standard 
participation game (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983) with the same voting costs but two groups of equal size 3. This is intuitive, 
since all 6 senders vote with probability 1 in allies, hence creating a tie and the remaining receivers play a participation game 
of three against three.  
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rates than receivers in both equilibria (1 vs. .303 and 1 vs. .697), whereas they participate at equal rates (.904) in 
the equilibrium for adversaries. Also, note that in all cases, in equilibrium, senders participate at higher rates at 
stage 2 than at stage 1. Note that stage 2 participation rates are defined as the fraction of senders that abstained at 
stage 1. As a fraction of all senders, participation is higher at stage 1 than at stage 2 in allies (.791 vs. .209 and 
.689 vs. .311), and higher at stage 2 in adversaries (.406 vs. .498). Finally, equilibrium participation by receivers 
is higher after observing abstention than after observing a sender casting a vote. The difference is largest for 
allies. 
 
We use these results in section 2, to derive comparative static predictions for our treatments.  
  x
APPENDIX B: Translation of instructions for treatment IP [IS, US] 
 
Welcome to our experiment on decision-making. Depending on  your own choices and the choices of other 
participants, you may earn money today. Your earnings in the experiment are expressed in tokens. 4 tokens are 
worth one Guilder. At the end of the experiment your total earnings in tokens will be exchanged into Guilders 
and paid to you in cash. The payment will remain anonymous. No other participant will be informed about your 
payment. 
 
Please remain quiet and do not communicate with other participants during the entire experiment. Raise 
you hand if you have any question. One of us will come to you to answer them. 
 
Rounds, ‘your group’ and the ‘other group’ 
 
The experiment consists of 99 rounds. At the beginning of the experiment the computer program will randomly 
split  all  participants  into  two  different  populations  of  12  participants.  In  addition,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
experiment the computer program will randomly divide the participants in each population into two groups of 6 
participants [IS and US: At the beginning of each round (...)]. The group you are part of will be referred to as 
your group and the group in your population which you are not part of will be called the other group. Note  that 
you will remain in the same population and group in the whole experiment [IS and US: Note that you will 
remain in the same population in the whole experiment. However, in each round participants in your electorate 
will be reallocated to groups.]. You will not know which of the participants belongs in the other group and 
which to your group. You will have nothing to do with participants in the other population in this experiment. 
[Additionally in IS and US: No matter what round you are in, the number of participants in the other group is 
always 6 and the number of participants in your group is also always 6 (12 in total).] 
 
Types ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ 
 
At the beginning of the experiment the computer program will randomly appoint all participants to be either 
sender or receiver. Each participant has the same chance of 50% to be a sender and 50% to be a receiver. 
However, the computer program arranges it such that each population has 6 senders and 6 receivers. You will be 
told whether you are a sender or a receiver at the start of the experiment. Your type sender or receiver will not 
change during the entire experiment. When groups are formed at the start of the experiment [IS and US: at the 
start of a round] the computer program will also ensure that there are exactly 3 senders and 3 receivers in each 
group. 
 
The following table shows the number of senders and receivers in each group. 
 
  Number of senders  Number of receivers  Total number 
Other group  3  3  6 
Your group  3  3  6 
 
Table:  Senders and receivers in the other group and in your group. 
 
Matching of senders and receivers [not for US] 
 
At the start of each round the computer program will randomly match one sender and one receiver to each other. 
Hence, if you are a sender you will be connected to one receiver and if you are a receiver you will be connected 
to one sender. Note that couples will be rematched at the start of each round. 
 
Three situations [not for US] 
 
At the start of each round the computer program will randomly determine one of the following three situations 
(each situation has the same chance of 1/3 of being chosen): 
 
All senders and receivers who are matched with each other are from the 
1.  same group (the other group or  your group), 
2.  different groups (the other group and  your group), or 




The chosen situation in a round applies to all participants, senders and receivers, in a population. Hence, within a 
round  it  cannot  be  the  case  that  some  participants  in  a  population  are  in  a  different  situation  than  other 
participants in the same population. Which of the three situations applies will be announced to you and all other 
participants at the start of each round. 
 
[A summary is given of the most important points so far]  
 
Part 1 and part 2 of a round and choices 
 
Each round will consist of two parts: part 1 and part 2. In each round choices will have to be made. We now 
explain the choices, which of the participants will be asked to make choices, and when they are made. 
 
Choices part 1: 
 
In part 1 of each round only senders will be asked to make choices. Receivers will not make a choice yet. Each 
sender will face an identical choice  problem.  They  will  be asked to make one choice. Senders can choose 
between the following two alternatives: 
 
•  ‘Choice A’:   no costs involved (0 tokens). 
•  ‘Choice B’:   costs are 1 token. 
 
After all senders have made a choice in part 1, each receiver will be informed about the choice, however, only 
about the one made by the sender connected to her or him. Only the receiver will receive information about the 
sender in the same couple. Beyond that, no one gets any information about choices by others. [This paragraph is 
not used in US; instead: This choice is private, no other participant is informed about it.] 
 
Senders choosing choice B in part 1 are not asked to make a choice in part 2. Senders choosing choice A in part 1 
will be asked to make a choice in part 2 as well. 
 
Choices part 2: 
 
In part 2 of each round, all senders choosing A in part 1 and all receivers will be asked to make choices. Each of 
these participants will face an identical choice problem. They will be asked to make one choice. Like in part 1 
they will choose between the following two alternatives: 
 
•  ‘Choice A’:   no costs involved (0 tokens). 
•  ‘Choice B’:   costs are 1 token. 
 
The choices in part 2 will not be announced to anyone. Hence, in part 2 receivers are not informed about the 
choice of the sender with whom they are connected. Note that each receiver will only get information in part 
1 about the choice of the sender connected to her or him, not in part 2. Senders will never get information 
about the choices of others. [This paragraph is  not used in US; instead: the individual choices in part 2 are not 




After all participants in part 2 have made their choices, the computer program will count the number of B-
choices per group in both parts, part 1 and part 2, and will compare the numbers in both groups. There are 3 
possible  outcomes  that  are  relevant  for  your  revenue  in  the  following  way.  You  will  receive  the  revenue 
irrespective of the choice you made and whether you are a sender or a receiver. 
 
(1) The number of B-choices in your group exceeds the number of B-choices in the other group. In this case 
each participant in your group (inclusive yourself) will get a revenue of 4 tokens. Each participant in the 
other group will get 1 token. 
(2) The number of B-choices in your group is smaller than the number of B-choices in the other group. In this 
case each participant in your group (inclusive yourself) will get a revenue of 1 token. Each participant in the 
other group will get 4 tokens. 
(3) The number of B-choices in your group is equal to the number of B-choices in the other group. In this case 
the computer program will randomly determine the group in which each participant gets a revenue of 4  
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tokens (each group has the same chance of 50% of being chosen). Each participant in the group that is not 
chosen will get 1 token. 
 
Your round earnings are calculated in the following way: round earnings = round revenue – round costs. Your 
total earnings are the sum of all of your round earnings. 
 
The following table gives your possible round earnings: 
 
Your possible round earnings: 
 
Your choice  Your group has 
more B-choices 
Your group has 
less B-choices 
Equal number of B-choices 
in both groups 
Choice A  4 tokens  1 token  4 or 1 token (50% chance each) 




The computer screen has four main windows. 
(1) The Status window shows your type sender or receiver, the actual round number, part 1 or part 2, and the 
total earnings up to the previous round. 
(2) The Previous round window depicts the following information about the previous round: 
(a) The situation, regarding the matching between sender and receiver [not for US]. 
(b) If you are a receiver, the choice in part 1(in the previous round) of the sender who is connected to 
you [not for US]. 
(c) The number of B-choices in your group. 
(d) The number of B-choices in the other group. 
(e) Your choice. 
(f) Your revenue. 
(g) Your costs. 
(h) Your round earnings. 
(3) In the Choice window you will find two buttons. Press the button “Choice A” or the button “Choice B” with 
the mouse, or press the key “A” or “B”. When you have chosen you will have to wait until all participants 
have made their choices. If you are a receiver, this window will also inform you about the choice in part 1 in 
the actual round of the sender you are connected to [this sentence not for US]. 
(4) The Result window shows the result of the actual round (both part 1 and part 2). This happens after each 
participant in part 2 has made a choice. Each yellow rectangle shown represents one B-choice of your group 
and each blue rectangle represents one B-choice of the other group. After a few seconds the result will also 
appear in numbers. 
 
At the upper bound of the screen you will find a Menu bar. You can use this to access the Calculator and History 
functions. The calculator can be handled with the number pad at the right side of your keyboard or with the 
mouse buttons. The function ‘history’ shows all information of the last sixteen rounds as this had appeared in the 
window ‘Previous round’. At the lower bound of your screen the Information bar is located. There you are told 




Before the 99 rounds of the experiment start, we will ask you to participate in three training-rounds. You will 
have to answer questions in order to proceed further in these training-rounds. In the training-rounds you are not 
matched with other participants but with the computer program. You cannot draw conclusions about choices 
of other participants based on the results in the training-rounds. The training-rounds will not count for your 
payment. 
 
We will now start with the three trainings-rounds. If you have any questions, please raise then your hand. One of 
us will come to you to answer them. 
 
 